HOW THE “NEW” NATIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION CREATES DISLOCATION OF POWER FROM CABINET AND A CRISIS OF AUTHORITY-IDENTITY WITHIN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNING SYSTEM.
President Jacob Zuma’s ascendancy to power and prestige was accompanied by lots of expectations and imposition from those who perceived themselves as genuine holders of “entitlement” to his victory. During Zuma’s campaign, expectations were raised by means of songs, slogans and subsequently through the ANC manifesto which itself culminated to the first state of the nation address made by the president in February 2009. Even in that state of the nation address, the president was on another “I promise you” mood, as he assured the nation of 500 000 thousand jobs “before the end of the year”.
That ambition or pipe-dream ignited mixed reaction from labour, business, civil society and government itself. The concern of the business sector was the validity and logic behind Zuma’s projection as the country, as well as the global financial system was going through a crisis. The other concern that business had to grapple with, as a follow up to Zuma’s ‘dream’, was that “which industries would be able to absorb 500 000 new job market tyros while retaining as many threatened jobs as possible”. The reaction of labour was being positioned, I would argue, by whether one is an economic idealist or realist. An economic idealist would arrive at the “illogical-logic” position of manner from heaven economics. This means that in this category, one would “believe” that by putting in place right institutions and adjustments, the government of Zuma would miraculously create the promised jobs. On the other hand, an economic realist’s response would react from a position that is informed by economic trends, carefully researched projections of the state of the economy.
The reaction from government, as was articulated by the monitoring and evaluation minister to be precise, was rather revealing of the disconnection between political rhetoric and sound economics. Minister Collin Chabane, re-interpreted the time frame of the president, namely, “within this year” to be either meaning; “within 2009, or within the financial year of government or twelve months from now”. The public sector would also have to share the burden of absorbing labour, thus create employment and more work for the public through tendering or extended public works program. President Jacob Zuma had to pull these forces together, at least through some institutional mechanism in order to fulfill the ‘illogical-logic” of creating 500 000 jobs.
Given the context of skepticism, or even perhaps agnosticism that prevailed before and shortly after Zuma’s rise to power, any shrewd politician emerging through populist campaigning tactics would to some extent sustain populism by economic rhetoric or promise of virtue. The launching of the national planning commission was yet another ‘invention’ within the many surprises that Zuma had in his bag. It appeared though, that the kind of competencies that the planning commission would have to be advanced if it hoped to rise above the politics of rhetoric to a level of high skill and intellect. The relocation of former minister of finance Mr. Trevor Manuel to head the commission was yet another indication that the commission sought to command efficiency, advanced skill base with some political clout. After the election jubilance, opposition parties were keen to see if any of the road-to-presidency rhetoric, or Zuma’s dreams and promises would ensure. Thus the national planning commission was already under pressure to keep the word of the president true by means of planning in line with the campaign rhetoric. For the commission to rise to that level, some level of power sharing and authority relocation between itself and the cabinet was inevitable. The first draft of the planning commission which was drafted by the minister and Mr. Joel Netitshenzhe was detailing how the commission would go about its mandate, as well as the kind of power and authority it would need in order to execute effectively. Immediately, the document was met with suspicion, contempt and lately rejected by organised labour as ‘giving too much power to the commission and advancing the political ambitions of minister Manuel’.
What organised labour appeared to be worried about is that Mr. Zuma, their man, as it is alleged, would be overshadowed by the prestige, competency and commanding effect of the commission, thus underscore their own influence to the president and policy. The draft document from the planning commission was also critiqued from perceptions that it would overshadow cabinet and even be in a position to overthrow cabinet resolutions when they do not ‘fit’ with the national plan. The interesting part again is that the debate moved from the commission and the cabinet, to Manuel and organised labour. Manuel was seen as advancing himself as the main chief and ‘his’ commission as an alternative cabinet. Indeed, I would agree that the commission’s influence could flow up-side down and visa verse and accumulate a lot of power in a short time. The top-down influence could be due the fact that the commission has to influence the planning of different departments; from direction to content to implementation tactics. And it could have a bottom-up influence by its role of advising the executive about direction imperatives that would have emerged from the department’s planning, which itself could be tainted by the power agenda of the commission.
How does this bring a leviathan crisis between the commission and the cabinet? Hobbes argues that due to the state of human nature, we tend to compete, strive for glory and prestige and gaining advantage over the other. Thus a need for a higher power, a power that will keep us in owe so that we are afraid to harm each other for fear of punishment by ‘that’ power remains. Hobbes than suggests that human beings enact and centralised power on an individual or group, which in turn must guarantee the security of one against the other. In other words, Hobbes suggests that as human beings, we must trade our freedom to a central power and in turn, that power trade back to us security. We vote governments with our free will so that they in turn may administer for us peace, order, justice and stability. That state of trading one’s personal freedom over to a centralised power in return for security is called by Hobbes the state of the Leviathan.
The question then is, to whom is our Leviathan as South Africans? Who has taken our freedom for the exchange of our security? Is it the national planning commission that we must willingly give our freedom to in exchange for greater economic, political, policy, institutional security or is it the cabinet. If government departments perceive the planning commission as its leviathan, to what extent does the authority of the commission goes? Does it go only as far as planning service delivery only or does it go as far as securing political advantage? If Zuma’s tenure does not deliver satisfactory, who is to take the fall? Is it the cabinet or the national planning commission? If the planning commission makes operational decisions, that take place within a national political discourse that influence the position of the state even in international affairs, what kind of decisions does cabinet make that are different to the planning commision? Does the ‘new’ national planning wing enhance the power of cabinet or does it dislocate its power and create a crisis of authority base?
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By: Israel Kwazi Mkhize
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